Pollock's drip technique generated certain unconventional representational possibilities, including the possibility of expressing the pre-reflective involvement of an embodied, intentional subject in a perceptual world. Consequently, Pollock's art can be understood to explore or investigate the pre-objective conditions of reflective and intellectual consciousness. His painting-here I consider Number 1, 1949-motivates viewers to consider the relationship between intention and meaning as it appears in both primordial and reflective dimensions of experience. The account proceeds in three stages. First, I review key features of Merleau-Ponty's concept of the preobjective and attempt to clarify the reflexive nature of investigating it by considering his analysis of Paul Cézanne's technique. Second, I consider Pollock's technique and some critical responses to it, while analyzing some of its implications for a notion of pictorial address. Finally, I examine the perceptual efffects of Number 1, 1949 and interpret them, following Merleau-Ponty's lead, in view of a revised understanding of the relationship between automatism and intention.
Introduction
The historical coincidence of Maurice Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology and the representational practices of Abstract Expressionist artists such as Barnett Newman and Jackson Pollock has often been noted, but the possible implications of the connection for interpretation have only occasionally been pursued in a sustained manner.3 The parallel development of the careers of these two fĳigures is remarkable. Both Pollock and Merleau-Ponty (1908 -1961 attempted to resist and to negate the conventional conceptions governing our understanding of perception and representation. For Merleau-Ponty, this meant momentarily "break [ing] with our familiar acceptance" of our "natural attitude," one generated by powerful, but suspect, theoretical presuppositions about how we supposedly perceive the world.4 For Pollock, it meant suspending powerful cultural presuppositions about how paintings depict the world, and it meant investigating-via a radical technique-the form and content of representational practices. For both, it meant rejecting an "objective" viewpoint in order to comprehend the genesis of meaning in and through a subject's embodied perception. The goal of this paper is to explore how Merleau-Ponty's attempt to describe phenomenologically the "pre-objective," "pre-reflective" or "primordial" depth that funds reflective thought might illuminate Pollock's analogous efffort to express that depth pictorially.5
My thesis is that Pollock's development of the drip, pour, and spatter technique in the years around 1947-50 generated certain unconventional representational possibilities, including the possibility of expressing the pre-reflective involvement of an embodied, intentional subject in a perceptual world.6 Pollock, I will suggest, thus discovered the means by which he could explore or investigate pictorially the pre-objective conditions of reflective and intellectual consciousness. Consequently, his painting-here I limit myself to an account of Number 1, 1949 (Figure 1 )-motivates viewers to consider the relationship between intention and meaning as it appears in both primordial and reflective dimensions of experience. The account proceeds broadly in three stages. First, I review key features of Merleau-Ponty's concept of the preobjective and attempt to clarify the reflexive nature of investigating it by considering his analysis of Paul Cézanne's technique. Second, I consider Pollock's technique and some critical responses to it, while also analyzing some of its implications for a notion of pictorial address. Finally, I examine the perceptual efffects of Number 1, 1949 and interpret them, following Merleau-Ponty's lead, in view of a revised understanding of the relationship between automatism and intention. mark in conscious memory or in unconscious habits of thought, behavior, or feeling. My use of the term resonates with how it is employed by John Dewey, who referred throughout his writings to "funded" experience and meaning, but nevertheless avoided defĳining it precisely. For useful discussions, see Stephen C. Pepper, "The Concept of Fusion in Dewey's Aesthetic Theory," Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 12, no. 2 (December 1953): 169-76, and Philip M. Zeltner, John Dewey's Aesthetic Philosophy (Amsterdam: B.R. Grüner, 1975) , esp. 11-13. 6) A comment on these two terms-representation and expression-seems called for. I use "representation" in a general sense to refer to what an artist achieves when he or she gives form to experience (or thought, or feeling) through a medium (obviously, in this sense, representation has nothing to do with whether a painting is fĳigurative or abstract). I want to distinguish my use of this term from representation understood as the classical mimetic paradigm in which thought and language are taken to represent an objective reality (a paradigm Merleau-Ponty struggled to defeat). As for "expression," my general sense of the term-and the meaning I hope my use of it carries-is informed by Lawrence Hass, who stresses that for Merleau-Ponty, expression was an operation "whereby some overwhelming initial form, fĳigure, datum, or image, is creatively transformed and reorganized in a way that radiates new meaning or insight, and which brings a strong feeling of necessity" (Merleau-Ponty's Philosophy Soon after Pollock's death in a car crash in 1956, a number of philosophers debated Merleau-Ponty's concept of a pre-objective world, a concept he had begun to fully develop in Phenomenology of Perception.7 Broadly speaking, Merleau-Ponty theorizes the pre-objective world to counter both empiricist and rationalist approaches to perception, which "reduce all phenomena which bear witness to the union of subject and world, putting in their place the clear idea of the object as in itself and of the subject as pure consciousness. [Objective thinking] therefore severs the links [that] unite the thing and the embodied subject" (PP, 320). If science assumes and describes such an objective world, despite or even in the face of the modes of appearance that Merleau-Ponty is at pains to describe, then his concept of the pre-objective world can be understood as an attempt to critique the natural attitude and to establish a genetic phenomenology that explains the ways in which embodied perception operates in the world before it is measured, analyzed, or described by scientifĳic discourse.
The pre-objective world is characterized by fundamental intentional bonds between subject and world that account for the immediate perceptual unity of that world and that fund-but are intertwined with-higher order reflexive, conceptual, or linguistic meanings.8 The pre-objective or primordial intentionality of consciousness is a general directedness towards the world that is the condition for meaning. Understood along these lines, the idea of pre-objective intentionality provides a counterweight to intellectualist positions that hold intentionality to be a matter of judgment or positing thought. Instead, it can be thought of as an "operative intentionality," in the sense of Edmund Husserl's "fungierende Intentionalität," a kind of primordial contact felt by a "lived body" of an original and material bond between the subject and the world.9 Because this intentionality is manifest as the lived body's concrete, spatial, and motile directedness to the world, meaning is an inherent possibility of our experience.
To clarify the intentional nature of the primordial bonds that bind the embodied subject to the world, Merleau-Ponty famously analyzes the experience of the phantom limb-in which he takes a patient's felt persistence of a missing appendage to be a certain refusal of its absence-to suggest that the lived body, properly understood, is not simply an object, but is rather a mode of inhabiting the world: "We must therefore avoid saying that our body is in space, or in time. It inhabits space and time. Consciousness is being-towardsthe thing through the intermediary of the body" (PP, .10 The embodied subject of primary perception is intentional (i.e., directed) but is not yet present to himself as a reflective or intellectual consciousness. Merleau-Ponty calls this subject "the anonymous one buried in the world" and asserts that it has a "global and inarticulate grasp upon the world."11 In taking a "pre-conscious possession of the world," the body-subject enters into a primordial reciprocity with the world in which subject and object mutually come into being (PP, 298) .
Genetic phenomenology illuminates the process by which a self-conscious, reflective subject emerges from the anonymity of the pre-conscious, preobjective world. "The task of a radical reflection," Merleau-Ponty wrote, "consists, paradoxically enough, in recovering the unreflective experience of the world":
What have we then at the outset? . . . [A] certain perceptual fĳield against the background of a world. Nothing here is thematized. Neither object nor subject is posited. . . . [P] rimary perception is a non-thetic, pre-objective and pre-conscious experience. . . . It is in the experience of the thing [within this primordial fĳield] that the reflective ideal of positing thought has its basis.
[R]eflection does not itself grasp its full signifĳicance unless it refers to the 9) On the relationship to Husserl, see Martina Reuter, "Merleau-Ponty's Notion of Pre-Reflective Intentionality," Synthese 118, no. 1 (January, 1999): 69-88. 10) Sentence order modifĳied. 11) Merleau-Ponty, "Working Notes," in The Visible and the Invisible, ed. C. Lefort, trans. A. Lingis (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1968), 201; and in PP, 404, respectively. unreflective fund of experience which it presupposes, upon which it draws, and which constitutes for it a kind of original past, a past which has never been a present. (PP, Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology analyzes embodied perception in order to return intellectual consciousness to the roots of unreflective experience that funds and gives value to its higher order constructions. It recursively discovers an "original past," one that is not literal but that is posited by a reflective consciousness.
The Originality of Pre-reflective Experience
In the late 1930s and early '40s, while Merleau-Ponty was systematically dismantling the classical conception of physiological psychology in The Structure of Behavior (1942 Behavior ( , trans. 1963 and preparing the ground for his analysis of embodied perception in Phenomenology of Perception (1945 Perception ( , trans. 1962 , Pollock was working through a mode of physical realism that he hoped would visually stimulate kinesthetic sensations in the viewer through certain compositional strategies, conveying to them a sense of embodiment. Various scholars have ably reviewed the historical and aesthetic contexts of this efffort, which found its origins in the teachings of Pollock's early mentor, Thomas Hart Benton, who had theorized about the literal transfer of muscular feeling through pictorial composition in the 1920s.13 But, as has often been argued, the content of Pollock's work between 1947-50-during which time he abandoned his earlier modes of corporeal expression in favor of allover abstractionunderwent signifĳicant revision, if not radical change.
While generalizing about the characteristics of Pollock's allover surfaces tends to diminish effforts to put forward interpretations of particular paintings, it is also the case that a broad view of shared features helps establish the 12) Emphasis added. The last sentence reads in the original: "La réflexion ne saisit donc ellemême son sens plein que si elle mentionne le fonds irréfléchi qu'elle présuppose, dont elle profĳite, et qui constitue pour elle comme un passé originel, un passé qui n'a jamais été présent" (Merleau-Ponty, Phénoménologie de la Perception [Paris: Gallimard, 1945] , 280). 13) Thomas Hart Benton, "The Mechanics of Form Organization, Parts I-V," The Arts (NovemberMarch, 1926 painter's intentions for some of their basic efffects. The technique of dripping or pouring paint on a horizontally laid canvas from its fours sides was a means for Pollock to cover it with a multitude of marks, maximizing the number of interrelationships between them, and yielding, in Michael Fried's description, a "layered impactedness, mobile intensiveness, and experiential density of the painted surface."14 The simultaneous avoidance of defĳinitively closed shapes or outlines produces an image resistant to stable fĳigure-ground relationships, challenging-and perhaps ultimately inhibiting-the viewer's achievement of visual equilibrium (understood broadly as the reduction of tension between the viewer and the perceptual fĳield, in this case, a visual, painted one). This thwarting of visual equilibrium has implications for how we interpret the modes of experience or consciousness Pollock's paintings express. Consider the point that Merleau-Ponty posits a body-subject who fĳirst experiences only a general directedness-an operative intentionality-towards the world through a primordial intentionality, but who subsequently comes to understand his or her subjectivity as generated in reciprocity with some stabilized fĳield of fĳigure-ground relations. Because the key perceptual efffects of Pollock's work are closely related to this basic destabilization of fĳigure-ground, considering the issue closely will ultimately help explain how his technique, and the pictorial fĳields it generates, can be interpreted as facilitating a viewer's recognition of the pre-objective conditions of reflective consciousness, and the primordial intentionality that subtends the emergence of the subject.
Although Merleau-Ponty never wrote about Pollock, he addressed fĳigure-ground relations in "Cézanne's Doubt" (1945) . In that essay, he presented the artist as a kind of phenomenologist, working against the assumptions of the natural attitude and carrying out his own form of critique of objectivism. Cézanne, Merleau-Ponty observed, distinguished between "the spontaneous organization of the things we perceive and the human organization of ideas and sciences."15 His project responds to this division:
We see things; we agree about them; we are anchored in them; and it is with "nature" as our base that we construct our sciences. Cézanne wanted to paint this primordial world. . . . He wanted to put intelligence, ideas, science, perspective, and tradition back in touch with the world of nature . . . "from which they came." (CD, (13) (14) 14) Michael Fried, "Optical Allusions," Artforum 37 (April 1999): 97-101, 143, and 146; here 97. 15) Merleau-Ponty, "Cézanne's Doubt" [1945] , J. Wild, ed., Sense and Non-Sense (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964), 16; hereafter cited as CD followed by page number in the text.
Looking at his paintings, a beholder experiences "the impression of an emerging order, of an object in the act of appearing, organizing itself before our eyes" (CD, 14) . This is a "lived perspective" that contrasts with a "geometric or photographic one" of the objectifĳied world, and results in part from Cézanne's tendency to resist clear distinctions between fĳigure and ground ("He did not want to separate the stable things which we see and the shifting way in which they appear" [CD, [13] [14] ). A key technical feature operates to complicate fĳigure-ground relations, namely, the consistency of Cézanne's application of short, near-parallel brushstrokes over a range of depicted objects, from patches of landscape, to buildings, to foliage, even to the sky. The overall efffect of Cézanne's touch is to collapse distinctions between background and foreground areas, since they share equal tactile, and thus visual, weight. Such physical regularity can be so insistent that it undermines the pictorial illusionism of the scene.16 The visual complexity generates an undecidable oscillation or pulse between fĳigure and ground. The efffect yields an impression of "matter as it takes on form, the birth of order through spontaneous organization" (CD, 13).
The signifĳicance of these pictorial efffects for phenomenological inquiry becomes clearer when we consider them in light of Merleau-Ponty's attempt to establish the originality of pre-reflective experience.17 For Merleau-Ponty, a chief task of genetic phenomenology, as the name implies, is to investigate origins, "re-achieving a direct and primitive contact with the world, and endowing that contact with a philosophical status" (PP, vii). "[R]adical reflection," he continues, "amounts to a consciousness of its own dependence on an unreflective life which is its initial situation" (PP, xiv). An immediate problem presents itself: since the nature of the origin must be discerned by thought, thought (however radical) confronts the difffĳiculty of establishing the originality of something that escapes it.18 The non-discursive nature of painting, however, might enable an artist to express the primordial beginnings of reflective (CD, 14) . This "freezing" is the condition for us to reflect on the meaning of the world of primordial perception, that "insurpassable plentitude" that for Merleau-Ponty is the "real" (CD, 15). If Cézanne's work "reveals the base of inhuman nature upon which man has installed himself," it does so because "only a human being is capable of such a vision which penetrates right to the root of things beneath the imposed order of humanity" (CD, 16). There is a fundamental reflexivity in Merleau-Ponty's project: the return to origins is not a literal one, for it is only from the point of view of the originated that the origin comes into focus. Cézanne's paintings recursively express pre-reflective experience, revealing the ground of our knowledge to be the "primordial historicity" of the lived body and the " 'there is' which underlies [scientifĳic thinking]."19 Since that world exists only from a human perspective, we might understand Cézanne's expressive act-conveyed by his mode of pictorial address-as an attempt to discover the pre-objective conditions of reflective thought, its intentional self-grounding. Stated in another way, Cézanne expresses the relationship of pre-reflective to reflective experience in order to show us the conditions for creating meaning while creating it.
II

The Interpretation of Origins and Depth
In a slightly diffferent sense of the term, investigating primordial "origins" as a platform for interpreting Abstract Expressionism has encouraged some scholars, drawing on phenomenology, to suggest that some artworks actually instantiate for a beholder an experience of the pre-reflective dimension of experience, in which objective categories of thought have not yet appeared and where 19) Merleau-Ponty, "Eye and Mind," in The Primacy of Perception, 160-161. subject and object appear merged. In his discussion of Barnett Newman, for instance, Yve-Alain Bois fĳinds Onement I (1948) to "actualize . . . something like an 'originary perception'," or "our birth-to-the-world."20 Similarly, in a study of Mark Rothko, James Breslin suggests that the painter's works "travel back to give us subjectivity in the process of forming, prior to language, prior to the 'fall' into hard boundaries."21 The philosopher Galen Johnson suggests that Newman's works help the viewer overcome, through the apprehension of a beauty that "transcends the subject-object dichotomy," nothing less than the "philosophical dualism of subject and object [that] underlies the divisions in Western civilization between spirit and matter, self and world, mind and body."22 (Similarly, Merleau-Ponty found that Cézanne's work "returns to just that primordial experience from which these notions [the distinctions of soul and body, thought and vision] are derived and in which they are inseparable" [CD, 16] ). Within this originary condition, the connection of the lived body to the world of primary perception is so close that the idea of two separate realms of experience, subjective and objective, threatens to become meaningless.
More recently, the art historian T. J. Clark has suggested that painting, in Pollock's hands, "might be able to put itself in a diffferent relation to the world. To be 'in' it, or 'of ' it, in ways which twist the familiar prepositions back on themselves."23 In discussing One: Number 31, 1950, Clark writes:
What was to be signifĳied by the interlace now was the logic of a certain way of dealing with the world. . . . And yet this was clearly a kind of dealing that, given [the world's] existence at the edge of our normal categories, could only be pictured as "something like pure, disembodied energy." What shall we call it, this mode of experience? Vestigial? Immediate? 334) It is central to Clark's account that this mode of experience-whatever we call it-is "signifĳied" (not lived or actually experienced). Instead, it is seen from the perspective of the "ruling symbolic regimes" of culture (ibid., 336). As a "wilderness," it is a space that is unoccupied by symbolic order; paradoxically, it is recognized as wilderness only through the symbolic.24 Like Clark, I think it would be wrong to consider Pollock's work as somehow giving us direct access to a content that is putatively beyond (or before) representation-that it is literally im-mediate. To make the mediated nature of the phenomenological description of pre-objective depth clear, Merleau-Ponty reminds us: "[W]e discover the unreflected. But the unreflected we go back to is not that which is prior to philosophy or prior to reflection. It is the unreflected which is understood and conquered by reflection."25 Pre-reflective experience, it deserves repeating, is "a past which has never been a present." It must be represented in order to be interpreted.
Still, there is a tendency, or a temptation, to speak of Pollock's paintings-as well as his technique of making them-as establishing so powerful a continuity between artist and his activity or between viewer and painting that the distinction between them collapses, leaving only an anti-representational immediacy called, in the gestalt psychologist Anton Ehrenzweig's memorable phrase, "undiffferentiated oceanic envelopment."26 Pollock perhaps sanctioned such views in his account of being "in" his paintings, of having "contact" with them, and of feeling as if he were a "part" of them.27 Early critics followed the artist's lead in emphasizing this bond. In 1950, Bruno Alfĳieri wrote that "Pollock has broken all barriers between his picture and himself: his picture is the most immediate and spontaneous painting. Each one . . . is part of himself."28 In his 1959 monograph, the poet Frank O'Hara extended this measure of indivisibility to the viewer's experience of Pollock's imagery. A viewer apprehends a "oneness which has no need for the mediation of metaphor or symbol."29 Anna Chave fĳinds "[t]he efffect of Pollock's classic poured and drip paintings [to be] cosmic or oceanic, like the infĳinity of the universe."30 These evaluations 24) Clark writes: "There is a kind of experience, these pictures say, that is vestigial, by the looks of it-unusable, marginal, uncanny in the limiting sense of the word-but that at least the parent culture leaves alone" (Farewell to an Idea, 335-36). suggest a sense of continuity or even merger between painter/viewer and painting that circumvents the need for interpretation. For his part, Ehrenzweig fĳirmly stressed the feeling that Pollock's works literally "sucked and enveloped the spectator inside the picture plane," producing a "manic experience of mystic oneness."31 And although ultimately recuperated by a secondary process that confers structure on the indeterminate phenomena, the experience is anti-representational enough while it lasts. When one looks at Pollock, [t] he surface gestalt lies in ruins, splintered and unfocusable, the undiffferentiated matrix of all art lies exposed, and forces the spectator to remain in the oceanic state of the empty stare when all diffferentiation is suspended. The pictorial space advances and engulfs him in a multi-dimensional unity where inside and outside merge. (HOA, 121) While the elimination of subject-object distinctions in these accounts might seem to converge on Merleau-Ponty's sense of pre-reflective experience, they nonetheless imply the suspension of the reflective thinking that MerleauPonty theorizes is necessary to rediscover, to "conquer," the pre-objective. And, it runs counter to my claim that in Pollock's work, the pre-reflective is represented-that it is expressed pictorially.
Pictorial Address
It is signifĳicant that Pollock's own testimony regarding his procedure implies an awareness of just this issue. He recognizes a distinction between the enactment of something like primordial perception (on the part of the painter as he paints) and the pictorial mediation necessary to express the pre-reflective so that it can come into view. The artist explained:
On the floor, I am more at ease. I feel nearer, more a part of the painting, since this way I can walk around it, work from the four sides and literally be in the painting. . . . Here, Pollock speaks, fĳirst, of a kind of immersion: being "in" the painting both literally and metaphorically, even to the point that he is so absorbed in his activity that he is "not aware of what [he's] doing." Second, he suggests an 31) Ehrenzweig, HOA, 118-19. 32) Pollock, "My Painting," JPI, 17-18. identifĳication: being "a part of the painting," in such radical "contact" with it that a loss of contact results in failure. Pollock enacts such a proximate connection between himself (subject) and his painting (object) that the distinctions between the two are all but obviated. Yet in opposition to this sense of merger, Pollock also refers to experiencing a feeling of reciprocity: "an easy give and take." Unlike identifĳication or merger, reciprocity necessarily implies a transaction between two entities that must be considered somewhat distinct from one another, even if their mutual exchange constitutes them as entities. Pollock evidently experiences this reciprocity as a balance between painter and painting. Finally, there is his description of a " 'get acquainted' period" during which he steps back, as if to separate himself completely from his work, in order to "see what [he's] been about;" we might say, to reflect.33
Recently, Michael Fried has written about this oscillation between merger and separation-between identifĳication and reciprocity-in terms that I think greatly illuminate Pollock's practice. Fried (in a discussion of Caravaggio) identifĳies a "moment,"
of extended duration, of the painter's engagement in the ongoing, repetitive, partly automatistic act of painting; I call that "moment" immersive, imagining the painter as so caught up, so immersed, in this phase of his work on the painting . . . as to be less than fully aware of any sharp distinction between the painting and himself [;]34 and he distinguishes it from a second "moment," notionally instantaneous, of separating or indeed recoiling from the painting, of becoming detached from it, which is to say of no longer being immersed in work on it but rather seeing it, taking it in, as if for the fĳirst time; I call that "moment" specular. (MC, 39) The contrast between the two "moments" (not to be understood as strictly chronological) indicates the artist's achievement in establishing the image as a 33) As Harry Cooper pointed out to me, it is also possible that the " 'get-acquainted' period" Pollock refers to occurs as the artist is immersed in the activity of painting and would thus be a key phase in the dialogic process by which Pollock comes to know what he was trying to accomplish. painting addressed to a beholder reciprocally, in what Fried calls "a relationship of mutual facing" (MC, 39). Pollock's representation of-and reflection on-the pre-reflective occurs pictorially, as a matter of an intentional mode of pictorial address. The notion demands a distinction between an object (artwork) that addresses and a subject (beholder) who is addressed.
III
Attention, Frame, and Format
Aspects of Fried's immersive moment resonate with what I have been describing as Pollock's investigation of the pre-reflective. Above, I quoted MerleauPonty describing the lack of distinctions in primary perception, where "neither object nor subject is posited" and where a "pre-conscious," automatistic mode of experience obtains. Yet how is a transition to reflection achieved? How does the primary perception of an embodied subject transform or develop into thought and expression? The reader will have anticipated that I see Number 1, 1949 as helping to answer these questions. But the answers must be given in terms of an interpretation of pictorial and perceptual efffects, using MerleauPonty as a guide. So, in arguing that Number 1, 1949 presents viewers with the opportunity to reflect on the pre-objective world, I do not want to imply that the painting actually depicts what that world might look like, as if it were a view onto some primordial scene. Nor do I want to suggest that it somehow permits a beholder literally to experience such a world, as if the act of viewing generates an unmediated afffective response to a primordial environment.
The painting is about fĳive feet high and eight and a half feet long, and consists of about seven colors in enamel (mostly white, black, yellow, and aluminum but also blue and pink). Pollock applied the white enamel last or nearly last, and its fĳilament-like loops and arcs appear as a kind of tracery responding to the splotchy spatters of aluminum, yellow, and blue below. Underneath it all, but interwoven with everything else, is a staccato web of black pours, spatters, and throws of varying thickness, density, and sheen. It is difffĳicult for a viewer to select from the surface any single pictorial incident that seems to impinge upon attention more than any other. Additionally, there initially appears neither an internal nor external frame of reference according to which a viewer might organize the fĳield hierarchically. Like the uniformly dispersed pictorial incidents, our eyes' focus and our mental attention is allover, fĳinding no place to rest and centered nowhere in particular (although it is also true that the eye is in some measure guided by the delicate, yet assertive, thrown white tracery). When the eyes, eventually tiring of rapid scanning, become less intent either on following visual paths or on the difffĳicult task of focusing on particulars, the surface appears somewhat degraded, a homogenous millingabout of flecks and specks. Asked by William Wright in 1950 how an individual should look at his work, Pollock replied, "I think they should not look for, but look passively."35 In doing so, we would not yet have begun to discriminate one "thing" from another (or indeed, to diffferentiate our "selves" from our environment): in short, our selective activity, our attention, would not yet have begun to play a decisive role in bringing structure to our experience.36
Merleau-Ponty's characterization of the pre-objective world, and the mode of primary perception taking place within it, illuminates aspects of these pictorial efffects. In pre-reflective experience, the organism is unable to organize objects into a unifĳied perspectival fĳield against which environmental changes (such as a modifĳication to the angle from which we view the object due to our movement) could be stabilized. As Merleau-Ponty writes, "the sensory fĳield [does not remain] stable while the subject perceives. . . . [There is] no univocal position, because no spatial framework persists from one perception to another" (PP, 29). Additionally, fĳigure-ground distinctions remain persistently uncertain or undecided. To explain how we move from this indeterminate horizon to the structured world we perceive in lived experience (which is not to suggest that our world is not without ambiguity), Merleau-Ponty analyzes the concept of attention, which "transform[s]" the primary perceptual fĳield and allows consciousness "to be present to its objects":
The fĳirst operation of attention is, then, to create for itself a fĳield, either perceptual or mental, which can be 'surveyed' (überschauen), [so that] consciousness does not 35) Pollock, "Interview with William Wright," JPI, 20. 36) My description of the homogeneity of the surface and its resultant de-diffferentiation of secure fĳigure-ground relationships should not be taken as implying that Pollock actually defeats fĳigure-ground perception. To do so is an impossibility. In criticizing the concept of an isolatable datum of perception, Merleau-Ponty writes: "A fĳigure on a background is . . . the very defĳinition of the phenomenon of perception, [it is] that without which a phenomenon cannot be said to be perception at all. The perceptual 'something' is always in the middle [milieu] of something else, it always forms part of a 'fĳield.' A really homogenous area offfering nothing to be [perceived] cannot be given to any perception" (PP, 4). Experimental fĳindings of Gestalt psychology confĳirm that even when a subject is placed in a situation where there is a lack of external stimulation (such as in front of a blank wall in low level lighting), she will still perceive fĳigures against uniform grounds, fĳigures that are often generated by internal somatic events (e.g. heartbeats or breathing). See M. C. Dillon, [60] [61] correspondingly lose what it has gained and, moreover, [does not] lose itself in the changes it brings about. (PP, 29) If the primary level of experience is characterized by immersion in a perceptual fĳield, then attention is the operation that allows a subject to detach herself from that fĳield and to assume a specular position in relation to it. Attention, moreover, is actively creative, not passively acquisitive. It does not just permit our acquiring information about a world that is already constituted before our attending to it. Rather, attention achieves a world by responding appropriately, but spontaneously, to its solicitations: Attention creates. The solicitation of our attention is not, or not merely, caused by objects but occurs spontaneously, generated by the drive of the organism to achieve equilibrium.37 Counter to empiricist and intellectualist positions, according to which attention merely clarifĳies what is already given, MerleauPonty suggests that attention inaugurates that primordial reciprocity by which we come into existence as subjects (PP, 53) .
The process can be interpreted in view of Number 1, 1949. When the beholder attends to center of the painting, another efffect gradually modifĳies the homogenous, de-diffferentiated perceptual fĳield I described above. It is not exactly that the center of the painting becomes a zone of clarity, but that an elliptical area around the center of the painting, about four feet across, appears as an area of relative stability, set offf against a fringe of amorphous or unstructured activity that appears to surround it. Much of this has to do with the way Pollock leaves the corner zones relatively sparse of pictorial incident, yet fastens the web to those corners with loops whose tightness contrasts with the comparative looseness of linear tracery in the middle zone. The recession of the web from the corners of the frame and the consequent kneading-in of space at those zones makes them salient for the whole. The faint structure given by this perceived ellipse slightly counters the allover quality of the surface.38 In 1956, Sam Hunter noticed a quality of Pollock's works that seems to hold especially in this case: "It is as if Pollock's fĳine lyricism must repeatedly be wrested free from the anonymous seething of brute, pigment matter. Yet, powered by an intense dynamism . . . , structure break[s] through and rise[s] out of the primal disorder . . . at the origin of Pollock's world."39
Perhaps another way to put it is to say that the efffect of visual degradation in Number 1, 1949 is achieved as if in opposition both to a sense of the perceived limits of the image (where it appears to end) and to a sense of the picture's physical edges, its frame (where it literally ends). Simply put, the surface's dediffferentiation, its uniformity and lack of hierarchy, compromises the power of its external boundaries, perceived or literal, to establish pictorial structure. At the same time, though, the internal framing of the ovoid provides a certain emergent structure to the image that restores to the painting a degree of pictorial cohesiveness that is more or less independent of both its perceived limits and the literal frame, as if the pictorial structure is now understood to be generated from the inside out, from the interior of the image to its frame, rather than the other way around.40
The relationship between the viewer's perception of this structure and the specifĳic manner in which the painting solicits this perception is reciprocal in the sense that it is not merely given (as if the painting were a stimulus causing an automatic response) but is achieved through an act of attention. Solicitation and response are bound in a productive interplay that does not isolate the person who senses (the sensor) from that which is sensed (the sensible). In Merleau-Ponty's words, The sensor and the sensible do not stand in relation to each other as two mutually external terms. . . . [In] [the] transaction between the subject of sensation and the sensible it cannot be held that one acts while the other sufffers the action, or that one confers signifĳicance on the other. . . . [A] sensible datum which is on the point of being felt sets a kind of muddled problem for my body to solve. I must fĳind the attitude which will provide it with the means of becoming determinate. . . . I must fĳind the reply to a question which is obscurely expressed. And yet I do so only when I am invited by it. (PP, 214)41
The initial de-diffferentiation of Number 1, 1949 is the muddled problem that the perception of this ellipse solves. In addition-and to switch gears somewhat-I want further to suggest that this solution (if that is the right word) might cause the viewer to become aware of, or to draw, a crucial distinction between two competing notions of pictorial structure. The fĳirst depends upon the degree to which the composition of elements within an array is seen to be adjusted to an external limit, specifĳically to the literal frame (I will call this notion "framed"). The second depends on a qualitative diffference between how the total array, the allover visual fĳield-which is something more than just the accumulation of separate marks-relates to that literal frame (I will use the term "format" to signify the qualitative diffference). If she attends to the framed structure, the viewer might see the painting in one of two ways. Either she projects a narrative of Pollock's physical interaction with his surfacesand perhaps senses his "easy give and take" with his paintings-by taking his marks to represent the coordination and reciprocity involved in creating them.42 Or, alternatively, she might take the relations between those elements and each other (and to the frame) to index mere automatic reactions, with the result that Pollock's fĳield threatens to be understood as the product of mechanical cause and efffect, of sheer stimulus and reflex response-not as an instance of the spontaneous, creative expression of depth.
To understand those marks either as visualizing reciprocity or else as indexing cause and efffect opposes the interpretation I would like to propose. I have been insisting that Pollock expressed something about how pre-reflective, embodied intentionality might come to be coordinated reciprocally with an emergent setting, a world (here, the physical limits of the canvas surface), and it is here that the notion of format comes into play. In attending to format, viewers might also recognize that the particular marks, lines, pools, smudges, colors, and viscosities that may appear either as automatic signs or as indications of coordination are also subsumed by the web as part of the painting's allover visual fĳield. And this fĳield has a diffferent relation to the frame than do the marks that constitute it. Above, I suggested that the de-diffferentiation of Number 1, 1949 was countered by an elliptical structure apprehended when the gaze of a viewer focuses on the center of the fĳield, a structure that creates the sense of the painting as a whole. I would now like to suggest that the constitution of that totality is format. It is as if format, as a representational possibilitythat is, as a structure that functions as a medium to convey expressive content, versus a merely literal shape-is to be understood itself as emergent from the fĳigurative depth of the fĳield, not given beforehand.43 On this account, format is the medium through which the expression of pre-reflective, embodied intentionality is achieved and through which reflective consciousness might "grasp its full signifĳicance" as intertwined with and emergent from a pre-objective setting (PP, 242).
Automatism and Embodied Intentionality
Pollock's technical facility-think of it as an exceptional coordination of bodily kinesthetics (comprised of both conscious actions as well as unconscious automatisms) with the physical properties of his materials, along with a recognition of the representational possibilities such a coordination createsenabled him to produce complex compositions within a framed area. Yet he produced something more than just a virtuoso example of composing multiple and seemingly infĳinitely varied elements positioned in relation to one another and to the literal frame of his canvases (no matter how interesting a viewer might fĳind such compositions to be). Pollock also achieved format in the special sense in which I have been using the term: he reveals to a beholder a visual fĳield that, far from being an accumulation of marks that are taken as traces or indexes of his movements or actions above the canvas, is expressive of the 43) Aspects of my analysis follow Fried's lead in "Shape as Form: Frank Stella's Irregular Polygons," reprinted in Art and Objecthood: Essays and Reviews (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 77-99. creative intentionality of the body's conscious actions and its automatisms. The two levels are interfused. 44 Automatism here appears in an unusual way. Pollock's automatism, like that associated with the Abstract Expressionists generally, is usually understood as an appropriation of surrealist automatism, itself understood as a technique for generating unconventional imagery. The term covers a set of deliberately employed techniques or procedures and is taken to be the means by which an artist circumvents her usual sense of intentional activity in order to access a level of experience 'beyond' or 'below' it.45 It is not my motivation here to review the complexities of that historical appropriation. Rather, I want to suggest that thinking of automatism as merely a technique-either one that is consciously utilized to circumvent skill and control in the creation of novel imagery, or that actually induces in the artist a mental or physical state that suppresses reflection or conscious control-has adverse consequences for understanding Number 1, 1949. Automatism, if it is to be interpreted-if it is to mean anything at all-must be taken, however paradoxical it initially sounds, as represented in Pollock's work, and as expressed by it. In Number 1, 1949, automatism is expressed as the basic intentionality of our situation in the world, analogous to pre-objective depth. 46 Considered as a mode of mental or bodily comportment, of general directedness, this modifĳied understanding of automatism might share something
